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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
DONALD CHAD NELSON,

Case No. 930543-CA

Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim.
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony,
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or
in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(iii)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
When the State showed only that there was an unlawful entry
into private premises and the jury's verdict of acquittal on a theft
charge reflected that appellant never touched the stolen items, was
the evidence insufficient for a burglary conviction?
"A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence
only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted."

State v. Salas# 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991)

(citations omitted); State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah 1989)
("A conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence cannot
stand").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On March 23, 1993, a jury found Donald C. Nelson "not
guilty" of Theft, a class A misdemeanor.

(R 93).

The same jury,

however, convicted him of burglary, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-202, in the Third District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Tyrone E. Medley, presiding.
Following a continuance and a 90 day evaluation,
(R 95-103), the trial court ordered Mr. Nelson to serve an
indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison,
together with various court-ordered amounts.
issued forthwith.

(R 105) .
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(R 105).

Commitment

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 31, 1992, Donald Nelson and Renee Willson were
in their apartment at 50 North "D" Street.

(R 304) (apartment 3).

They had been entertaining some friends for most of the day,
including other tenants in the same apartment complex.

(R 295, 314).

One tenant in the same small twelve unit complex, Michael
Nyer, had not been invited to Nelson's New Year's Day party.
(R 295).

Nyer was alone all of New Year's Eve.

(R 251).

He lived

in apartment 5, a neighboring unit whose wall Nelson used for a dart
game.

(R 310).

Darts were thrown at a target on Nyer's wall.

(R 310).
Nelson and Nyer did not speak regularly to each another,
although Nyer had expressed resentment at Nelson for playing darts
late at night.

(R 310) . Nyer told Nelson the game was noisy and

"tossed" his darts.

(R 247) . Don recalled that Nyer "said

something underneath his breath and slammed his door."

(R 310).

Nyer also had complained to the apartment landlord about the dart
playing.
game.

The landlord in turn set a 10:00 p.m. curfew for the

(R 312).
At approximately 10:00 p.m., New Year's Eve, Don and Renee

were celebrating the coming of the New Year by playing cards with
their friends and throwing darts in the hallway.

(R 295).

An hour

later, Nelson's friends left for other festivities while Don and
Renee remained at home.

(R 305).

Shortly after midnight on January 1, 1993, Don called his
relatives to wish them a Happy New Year's.
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(R 296).

After the

phone call, Renee was . . . doing dishes [when] Donald stepped in
the kitchen to discuss something . . . "
in an argument" about Renee's cousin.

(R 296, 305). The two "got
(R 305). They sat down and

talked awhile, with Don making them something to eat, but the
squabbling continued into the bedroom.

(R 305).

Renee went to

sleep at about 2:35 a.m., after they had "made up."
Don never left their bedroom.

(R 297, 305).

(R 297, 300).

During that same period of time, Denise Robison's apartment
was burglarized.

(R 272).

Denise's unit, apartment 6, was only

four to six feet away from apartment 5, Michael Nyer's residence.
(R 235, 239, 267). Shifting attention away from himself, Nyer
suggested that Don, Renee, and their dart playing friends were
involved in the burglary.

(R 260, 264). Nyer eventually admitted,

however, that he had no basis to believe that Don's friends were
involved other than that they "hung out together" and "associated
with one another."

(R 261-62).

At 1:15 a.m., New Year's Day, Denise Robison left her
apartment to go to a party.

Denise's compact disc player and her

roommate's portable stereo were still inside the apartment.
(R 269).

The portable stereo was 2 and 1/2 feet long and 1 and 1/2

feet tall.

(R 283).

The bulky items could not be concealed.

According to Michael Nyer, at 1:30 a.m. he awoke to "a
crackling, crunching-type of sound".

(R 233).

The noise Nyer heard

was a back door opening, "[i]t is a light-weight noisy door that
crunches open and crunches closed."

(R 236).

Nyer went to his

bathroom and "saw the defendant standing at the window of apartment
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No. 6 opposite of me."

(R 234).

back in the back door."
returned to bed.

Nyer watched Nelson until "he went

(R 236).

(R 236).

When Nelson departed, Nyer

Nyer testified that he was not alarmed

"and I didn't really feel that, you know, that this was unauthorized
entry."

(R 243).
Nyer heard "more crunching ice noise".

was again at the window doing something.
what."

(R 236).

peephole.

"[T]he defendant

I [Nyer] could not see

Nyer went to his front door and looked through his

(R 236).

He saw Nelson leave the apartment although

again there was nothing in his hands.
to bed a second time.

(R 238, 255-56).

Nyer went

(R 238).

At no time did Nyer observe Nelson carrying anything out of
the apartment.

(R 241).

Nyer first awoke around 1:30 a.m. and

thought that the entire sequence of events lasted 20-30 minutes.
(R 232, 242).
When Denise Robison returned to her apartment, she
immediately realized that she had been burglarized.
called the police.

(R 270).

She

Denise's CD player and her roommate's portable

stereo were reported missing.

(R 270).

There also was a broken

window, although Nyer was unaware of that fact until the next day.
(R 264).
On New Year's Day, Nyer approached Denise and claimed that
he knew what happened.
to the police.

(R 245).

on Nyer's account.

(R 273).

He blamed Don and gave a statement

The investigating officers relied entirely

(R 290).

The officers did not "dust" Denise's

apartment for fingerprints and they found no useable physical

- 5

-

evidence from the broken window.

(R 288, 290). They did not search

Nyer's apartment.
The officers went to question Nelson.

They asked to search

Don and Renee's apartment and received their immediate consent.
(R 298, 308). Although the police uncovered nothing from the
search, they decided to arrest Don anyway based on Nyer's
statements.

(R 308).

At trial, the jury acquitted Don of theft.

(R 93).

They

did not believe that he had "obtained or exercised unauthorized
control over" the CD player or the portable stereo.

(R 78).

Following the trial court's denial of Mr. Nelson's motion to amend
the burglary charge with criminal trespass, (R 317), the jury was
allowed to convict him of burglary.

(R 92).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The jury's verdict of acquittal on the theft charge
reflected their belief that Don Nelson never obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the stolen items. While the State's
evidence established an unlawful entry, the surrounding
circumstances and the jury's "not guilty" verdict on the theft
charge suggested nothing more than a reckless intent.

The burglary

conviction should be vacated with criminal trepass entered in its
place.
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT PREVENTED THE JURY FROM
CONSIDERING THE CHARGE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS INSTEAD OF
BURGLARY
"The mere unlawful entry into private premises may not
alone support a finding of intent."
117 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).

State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113,

This supreme court holding applies

directly to Mr. Nelson's case.
At the outset, Mr. Nelson concedes that the State's
evidence established an unlawful entry, the first element of a
burglary.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202. This evidence in and of

itself, however, does not support a finding of criminal intent.
Id.

Even when the marshalled facts and inconsistencies are viewed

in a favorable light, the prosecution's case-in-chief still failed
to the intent required for burglary.
Michael Nyer, a tenant in apartment 5, claimed that he
twice saw Don Nelson in Denise Robison's apartment on January 1,
1993.

(R 233-56).

Denise's apartment doors were locked and any

entry would have been unauthorized.

(R 270, 277). By contrast, Don

Nelson and Renee Willson both testified that they had been arguing
in their apartment during the time in question.

(R 296, 305).

Nevertheless, appellant assumes, arguendo, that the jury
disregarded his alibi. He assumes that the discrepancies in time
were of no consequence.

Compare (R 232, 242) (Nyer awoke at 1:30

a.m. and testified that his observations and the entire sequence of
events last 20-30 minutes), with (R 297, 305) (until at least 2:35
a.m., Don was with Renee).

He also assumes that Nyer's
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identification of an intruder dressed in a dark shirt, dark gray
sweat pants, and "brand new, fancy, high-tech" high top shoes could
be reconciled in a light favorable to the white washed pants and old
tennis shoes worn by Don.

Compare (R 252-53), with (R 299, 306-07).

Other nonfactors for the jury included Michael Nyer's
exclusion from Nelson's party and his feelings of resentment for the
dart throwing.

(R 295, 310). Ignored were Nyer's own ability to

access Denise's next door apartment and his unsolicited
"finger-pointing" of Don.

(R 259, 273). Once the blame had been

directed at Don Nelson, the police never attempted to search Nyer's
apartment.

(R 259).

Notwithstanding all of these shortcomings, Michael Nyer's
identification only established that Don Nelson had unlawfully
entered into apartment 6 without Ms. Robison's permission.

State v.

Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 117 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), lends guidance in
this regard.
In Pitts, the defendant entered a convenience store which
had just received "a dark yellow bank envelope containing its bank
statement and cancelled checks."

Id. at 114.

The envelope was left

in the back corner of the office in an area not open to the public.
Id.

When defendant Pitts exited the store, he "returned to [his]

car [with] a dark yellow envelope similar in appearance to the
store's bank envelope delivered that morning.

[A passenger]

inquired [about] the envelope, and defendant told her that the
envelope contained checks, but 'they weren't for him, somebody else
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could use them.7"

Id. at 115.

Pitts then went to a friend's house

where he maintained careful possession of the envelope.

Id.

Police eventually found the envelope in defendant Pitts'
car.

Four blank checks from the store were "missing and were later

rejected by the bank when their forged negotiation was attempted."
728 P.2d at 115.

Pitts did not testify at [his burglary] trial."

Id.
Following his conviction, the supreme court affirmed on
appeal, concluding:
The mere unlawful entry into private premises may
not alone support a finding of intent. But
defendant's unexplained possession of another's
property, his subsequent statements and conduct, and
other unrebutted evidence of the surrounding
circumstances also support the reasonable inference
that defendant entered or remained in the office with
the specific intent to commit theft.
Pitts, 728 P.2d at 117 (emphasis added).
In the present case, however, Donald Nelson never possessed
another's property, nor were there any suspicious statements or
conduct.

The surrounding circumstances did not support a reasonable

inference of the specific intent to commit a theft.

Don and Renee

freely consented to the investigating officers search of their
apartment.

(R 298, 308). They both explained that at the time in

question they were in the kitchen, they were in an argument, and
they were in the bedroom.

(R 296, 297, 300, 305). Even if Don's

alibi was discounted, Michael Nyer's own account still proved only
an unlawfully entry.
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Nyer admitted that when he saw Nelson in the bathroom—with
the lights on and the Venetian blinds open—Don did not look like he
was trying to hide anything.

(R 256).

Indeed, the portable stereo

(measuring 2 and 1/2 feet long by 1 and 1/2 feet tall) would have
been impossible to hide.

(R 283-84).

In each of Nyer's claimed

sightings—from the bathroom window to the front door peephole—Don
was observed with nothing.

(R 241).

If Nelson did enter the

apartment, at no time during the entire 20 to 30 minute sequence of
events in which the sightings took place did the State prove that
Nelson had even touched the portable stereo or the compact disc
stereo system.

(R 238, 241, 255-56).

apartment, he left empty-handed.

If Nelson had been in the

(R 255-56).

The jury's verdict of acquittal on the theft charge further
reflects that Don did not "obtain or exercise unauthorized control
over11 the portable stereo or the CD player.

(R 78) . The jury

believed that Don never handled the items for even the slightest
moment since the briefest handling of them would have constituted
"exercis[ing] unauthorized control over" another's property.
(R 78).

Somebody else—a person who possessed the requisite

intent—had removed the property from the premises.
While the circumstances in Pitts need not duplicate those
in the present case, see 728 P.2d at 117, the complete lack of Pitt
circumstances here and the jury's verdict of acquittal on the theft
charge leaves the State with a "mere unlawful entry into private
premises."
intent."

Such evidence "may not alone support a finding of

Id.
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However, as suggested by defense counsel below, the
evidence was arguably enough for criminal trespass.

(R 317).

Under

Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-206(2)(a)(iii), "[a] person is guilty of
criminal trespass if, under circumstances not amounting to burglary
. . . [h]e enters or remains unlawfully on property and . . . [i]s
reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety
of another."

Id.

The more culpable intent required for burglary

would not be needed for criminal trespass; the lesser offense only
requires "recklessness" and an unlawful entry.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-6-206(2)(a)(iii).
The evidence was insufficient to support a burglary
conviction.

Mr. Nelson's conviction should be set aside with

criminal trespass entered in its place.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-1-402(5) (if "an appellate court on appeal . . . shall
determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction
of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may
be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for
the included offense. . . " ) .
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
burglary conviction and enter criminal trespass in its place.
SUBMITTED this /6D

day of December, 1993.
/

Z.l
. FUJI

RONAILD S. FUJINO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this J>0

day of December,

1993.

DNAtLD S .

DELIVERED by
this

day of December, 1993.
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ADDENDUM A

episode — Included offenses.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evide^e to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is suffident evidence to support a conviction for an ^ ^ < ^ ^ ^ ^ $
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
[ S e n t of conviction Stered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.

76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.

76-6-206. Criminal trespass.
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means intrusion of the entire body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204:
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) Intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person thereon or
damage to any property thereon; or
(ii) Intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony;
(iii) Is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the
safety of another.
(b) Knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on
property as to which notice against entering is given by:
(i) Personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone
with apparent authority to act for the owner; or
(ii) Fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of
intruders.
(3) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C misdemeanor unless it was
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor. A violation of Subsection (2Kb) is an infraction.
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section:
(a) That the property was open to the public when the actor entered or
remained; and
(b) The actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's

